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Abstract
If global trade were fair, it is argued, then international aid would be unnecessary and inequalities inherent 
to the economic system would be justifiable. Here, we argue that while global trade is unfair, in part because 
richer countries set the rules, we believe that additional interventions must go beyond trade regulation and 
short-term aid to redress inequalities among countries that will persist and possibly worsen in spite of such 
measures. Drawing on an example of measures taken to redress the characteristics of a system that inherently 
increases inequality, the ability of dominant teams in the National Basketball Association (NBA) to recruit 
the most talented players, we argue that market-based competition even in the context of fair rules will create 
and amplify economic inequalities. We argue that, just as the NBA created a draft to reduce the emergence of 
severe inequalities among teams, systems of social support within richer countries should be paralleled by a 
global system to counterbalance persisting inequalities among countries that are produced by market forces. 
We explain how such a mechanism might operate among integrated market economies, and identify the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) as an example of such an emerging 
form of global social support.
Keywords: Inequality, Redistribution, Social Protection
Copyright: © 2015 by Kerman University of Medical Sciences
Citation: Ooms G, Stuckler D, Basu S, McKee M. A global social support system: what the international 
community could learn from the United States’ National Basketball Association’s scheme for redistribution 
of new talent. Int J Health Policy Manag. 2015;4(11):715–718. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2015.126
*Correspondence to:
Martin McKee
Email: martin.mckee@lshtm.ac.uk
Article History:
Received: 26 March 2015
Accepted: 8 July 2015
ePublished: 9 July 2015
    Perspective
Full list of authors’ affiliations is available at the end of the article.
http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2015, 4(11), 715–718 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2015.126
Rules, Redistribution, and the National Basketball Association 
Draft 
Professional sports teams that win have at least 2 advantages 
over losing teams in the subsequent season: (a) better starting 
conditions (such as possession of the top players and coaches); 
and (b) greater ability to maintain their lead, as they earn 
more money than poorer teams to recruit new players with 
higher salaries. 
These advantages prevailed in the early years of US basketball 
as the best teams recruited the top regional and college 
basketball players every year. The result was a relatively rigid 
and unequal system, whereby the winners stayed on top and 
the losers fell behind. Games became predictable and less 
competitive as the dominant regional team would inevitably 
win, eroding the sporting ethos, and drawing fewer crowds.1 
Even though the sport was suffering, the system was self-
perpetuating: winners continued to recruit the best players, 
drawing on their money and prestige. In 1947, the then 
Basketball Association of America (now the NBA) introduced 
a draft to correct for these imbalances. Teams were given turns 
selecting amateur US basketball players, in reverse order of 
their win-loss record in the previous seasons. The draft gave 
the worst performing teams the first pick of new, talented 
college rookies. These rookie picks are highly valued, and can 
be traded to other teams for cash or even other players.
The draft is essentially a system of redistribution. It 
counters the ‘first’ distribution of winners and losers from 
the competitive process that, on its own, would enable 
winning teams to maintain their lead in the next season by 
earning more money and support. By acting as a ‘second’ 
redistribution, the draft is intended to create a fairer playing 
field—and ultimately a more exciting game—than would arise 
in a situation of accumulating inequalities between teams. 
Redistributing players in this way is designed to prevent 
inequalities from becoming so extreme as to harm the overall 
well-being of the NBA as a sporting enterprise. 
The redistributive characteristics should mitigate the 
continuing accumulation of inequalities arising from teams’ 
advantages over each other and enhance the basketball league 
overall by increasing competitiveness, while neither creating 
a totalitarian system that forces players onto certain teams, 
nor eliminating the skills gap between teams by forcing 
total equity. Assessing the extent to which drafts such as 
this achieve their stated goals is complicated because of the 
other features of each system, including how it addresses the 
incentive to lose matches for future gain2 and what happens to 
those recruited in subsequent years.3 Evaluating the impact of 
the NBA draft is further complicated by the introduction of a 
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series of changes, such as those that have incentives selection of 
less experienced players4 as well as the role of other influences 
on players’ career trajectories, of which racial discrimination 
is the most studied.5 Nonetheless, it is the principle that is 
important as there are many other situations in which there 
are entrenched inequalities which stifle competition. 
One such situation, of considerable contemporary relevance 
given discussions on the post-2015 development agenda, is 
the distribution of global income. As Milanovic has noted, 
although there is some evidence of progress in narrowing 
inequalities among countries, the gap remains wide.6 He 
contrasts the situation whereby “[s]ociety tries to limit these 
inherited advantages by either taxing wealth or by making 
education, health etc. available to all, regardless of their 
income level” with the “global world,” in which no such 
mechanisms exists.6 In this paper, we ask whether we can learn 
anything from the NBA draft about the scope for addressing 
these global inequalities?
The NBA’s draft system has been cited by Rawls to illustrate 
what he called ‘background institutions’ required for justice: 
“background institutions must work to keep property and 
wealth evenly enough shared over time to preserve the fair 
value of the political liberties and fair equality of opportunity 
over generations.”7 It has parallels with aspects of the 
economic system that combine market-based competition 
with redistributive social protection mechanisms within a 
country. Individuals and firms compete in the market place 
(playing field) but governments (NBA) then redistribute 
resources for mutual benefit. This redistribution does not 
involve picking players but rather takes the form of ‘social 
spending,’ accounting for about 20% of national income of 
rich countries.8 This social spending creates opportunities for 
the most disadvantaged members of society to avoid harm 
resulting from poverty and to tide them over temporary 
misfortunes. Social support programmes include investments 
in job creation and retraining, theoretically enabling 
individuals and firms to develop talents and use them for 
their personal prosperity and—through taxation—to produce 
further social support systems for the prosperity of their 
compatriots.
In contrast, such redistributive measures are largely absent 
from the global economy, which envisages that progress 
will come about primarily from free trade, with explicit 
redistribution limited to time-dependent and, in the scheme 
of things, relatively small-scale aid. Free trade is viewed as 
benefitting everyone; it is considered in the interests of states 
to trade regardless of whether their trading partners are 
more or less advanced.9 This draws on Ricardo’s theory of 
comparative advantage, which emphasises that each country 
should specialise in an area where it has a trade advantage 
over the other. In such circumstance, trade is assumed to 
make both countries better off, because they can maximise 
their strengths.
Yet there has never been fair competition in global trade. 
Analogous to the NBA before the draft, there were 2 important 
mechanisms of inequality. First, the rich countries had a head 
start. African and Asian countries were poorly prepared 
for independence by their experience of colonisation and 
exploitation. These countries had very little capital, few 
professionals and an extremely limited capacity to train future 
business leaders. Under the premise that their low labour 
costs would create a situation where capital and resources 
flowed toward them, they were soon required to abandon 
protectionism and compete with countries benefiting from 
centuries of knowledge and capital accumulation. Second, 
rich countries attract both capital and human resources from 
poor countries. Unlike the NBA, however, the global market 
has no draft mechanism to help poor countries attract talented 
‘players.’ In fact, the opposite occurs through ‘brain drain’ 
of talent in poor countries to the rich (while those without 
recognised talents to offer are increasingly excluded from rich 
countries by ever more stringent barriers to migration). In 
combating such entrenched inequalities, the NBA draft is not 
a panacea. It is embedded in a much more complex system of 
cross-subsidies, such as rules for sharing gate and television 
revenue and a salary cap, whereby the total payroll of each 
team is limited (although there are numerous exceptions).10 
For any global redistributive system to tackle longstanding 
challenges of brain drain and the disadvantages from decades 
of underdevelopment would also require additional cross-
national transfers of resources, many of which will likely 
prove politically and economically challenging.
And there is a third mechanism of inequality: rich countries 
set the rules. Whereas the referees of the NBA can be presumed 
to be objective, as they are hired and paid by the league, at 
least 3 ‘referees’ in the global market—the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)—have been designed by rich countries 
and have often acted in their interests. This allows rich 
countries to require poor countries to down-scale measures 
that protect their economies, and the health and welfare 
of their population,11 while rich countries can perpetuate 
subsidies that support their strategic interests and domestic 
electorates.12 This is only somewhat different to the historic 
enforcement of trading rules by military force, as in the 19th 
century Opium Wars between Great Britain and China. Now, 
political force may be more subtle, but is equally powerful, 
as in the pressure brought to bear by American governments 
seeking to block domestic anti-tobacco legislation in 
Southeast Asia in the 20th century.13 The level playing field 
envisaged in the rhetoric of the global financial institutions 
remains as illusory as ever. 
In sum, our analysis suggests to us that, while the persistence 
of inequalities among countries can, at least in part, be blamed 
on unfair regulation of the global market (rich countries 
setting the rules), the lack of a redistributive mechanism at an 
international level is also a factor. 
Modest Beginnings of a Global Social Support System
Unless the global trade system that creates massive inequalities 
can be countered, progress towards future sustainable 
development goals (SDGs) will be limited. While recognising 
that it cannot be a solution on its own, a system analogous to 
the NBA that could redistribute resources could contribute to 
this objective. But what might such a system look like?
We envision a fund for global social support to underpin the 
SDGs. This would, like the IMF, be a pool of funds available 
to member states. It differs, however, in that the winning 
countries in the international trade system would put in a 
portion of their winnings (a tax) each year, while the losing 
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countries in the international trade system would have a 
sustained, domestic-welfare-like system of social support. 
Elsewhere we have shown that such a scheme could meet 
the $50 per person target for low-income countries with 
a fund of between $169 and $821 billion per year, which 
is between 0.25% and 1.27% of per capita income from 
participating countries.14 This is more than high-income 
countries currently contribute to international development 
assistance, but this scheme is fundamentally different from 
conventional development assistance. Furthermore, as poorer 
countries grow, the gap, and thus the size of the fund, would 
narrow over time. For example, it would boost the ability of 
low-income countries to compete in world markets, thereby 
widening the pool of producers, while also alleviating many 
social problems which are ineffectively being addressed by 
current aid systems. An alternative scheme would require 
only $43 billion per year, but leans closer to conventional 
‘donor-to-recipient’ aid.15
Of course, some will argue that in the absence of a global 
government, a global social support system is impossible. 
Who would decide which countries should contribute how 
much, which countries should benefit and for how long, 
and what should the money be put towards? Would there be 
constraints on what the money might be spent on and would 
there be penalties for corruption? It would be premature to 
specify how such funds should be allocated and what strings 
might need to be attached to ensure it adds value for poor 
countries and poor people in those countries. The design 
would need to address known deficiencies in the existing 
aid system, including aid diversion (such as when aid is 
used for military spending) and displacement (such as a 
when aid simply replaces money that governments would 
have otherwise spent). We recognise that these details need 
to be agreed but we also note that such a system already 
exists, albeit on a relatively small scale. The international 
community has established systems that create global social 
support without a global government. As one precedent, some 
years ago the World Bank announced that its International 
Development Association (IDA) secured an unprecedented 
US$49.3 billion funding package for the following 3 years.16 
This was the result of the 16th IDA ‘replenishment’: over 5 
decades, the IDA managed to gradually increase its resources, 
now contributed by 51 countries. The IDA has agreed criteria 
that classify its members into beneficiaries, contributors, or 
in between both (neither beneficiary nor contributor). This 
creates a mechanism by which global social support could be 
permanent, while countries change positions in the scheme. 
This is the essence of mutuality as winners and losers change 
places in the long run. However, the IDA is also limited and 
insufficient. It provides nearly all of its assistance as loans for 
time-bound projects; both elements indicate the intended 
temporality of the assistance. Moreover, it is well-known 
that the recipient countries have been mired in debt due to 
the loan-based nature of this aid, and that the temporality 
has produced serious problems for the development of 
permanent infrastructure for domestic social support systems 
like healthcare and education institutions.
Another precedent for international social support is the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the 
Global Fund). The Global Fund explicitly aims to provide 
sustained (for as long as countries need it) social support, as 
seen in its guidelines to applicants stating that “[t]he applicant 
is not required to demonstrate financial self-sufficiency for 
the targeted interventions by the end of the proposal term.”17 
In an earlier paper, we argued that the Global Fund, if it were 
given a replenishment system like the IDA as, could serve 
as a foundation for a global social health protection fund.18 
The Global Fund also offers some lessons on ways to address 
some of the challenges that a global social health protection 
fund would face, such as the involvement of civil society 
organisations to increase transparency and accountability.19
Conclusions 
When considering a dilemma being discussed around the 
world—should efforts to accelerate the reduction in global 
inequalities mainly focus on fair regulation of the global 
market, as in “fair trade not aid,”20 or also aim to establish 
a global social support system between countries, as in ‘fair 
trade and better aid’— we can learn from the history of rich 
countries. Market regulation—with governments imposing 
minimum wages, prohibiting child labour, and protecting the 
freedom to organise in unions—contributed significantly to 
reducing inequalities in years past. Market regulation went 
hand-in-hand with the creation of social support systems: the 
greater the market, the greater the need for support to ensure 
fair competition.21 Publicly financed education, healthcare 
and income replacement support decreased the vulnerability 
of wage-dependent workers, both allowing them to demand 
stronger market regulation and enabling them to play a part 
in the marketplace.22 
A sustained system for international social support (a new 
type of global fund) is both needed and feasible. The Global 
Fund was not conceived as an institution for global social 
support, as it is directed almost exclusively to 3 diseases rather 
than broader issues of healthcare, education, housing and 
food; yet its ability to provide open-ended support probably 
stems from the realisation that AIDS treatment should not be 
interrupted (and that some countries would remain too poor 
to take over the financial burden of treatment). That could 
become the—perhaps accidental—legacy from the global 
fight against HIV to global social justice.23 Chronic problems 
of AIDS, malnutrition, and poverty all require permanent 
solutions. 
Although we are still far away from a comprehensive global 
social support system, the Global Fund shows that such a 
fund is possible without a global government. What seems 
to be needed is, first, a common understanding that global 
social support is just as important for further reducing 
global inequalities as is fair regulation of the global market 
economy, and that social support systems have been essential 
in reducing inequalities and sustaining stable communities in 
rich countries. If even a simple sports competition—obeying 
to simple rules, applied by objective referees—requires 
permanent redistribution to maintain fairness and enhance 
competitiveness, how would market forces alone be able to 
reduce global inequalities? 
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